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Abstract
A valuable experimental model for the pathogenesis of anxiety disorders is that they originate from a learned association
between an intrinsically non-aversive event (Conditioned Stimulus, CS) and an anticipated disaster (Unconditioned Stimulus,
UCS). Most anxiety disorders, however, do not evolve from a traumatic experience. Insights from neuroscience show that
memory can be modified post-learning, which may elucidate how pathological fear can develop after relatively mild
aversive events. Worrying - a process frequently observed in anxiety disorders - is a potential candidate to strengthen the
formation of fear memory after learning. Here we tested in a discriminative fear conditioning procedure whether worry
strengthens associative fear memory. Participants were randomly assigned to either a Worry (n=23) or Control condition
(n=25). After fear acquisition, the participants in the Worry condition processed six worrisome questions regarding the
personal aversive consequences of an electric stimulus (UCS), whereas the Control condition received difficult but neutral
questions. Subsequently, extinction, reinstatement and re-extinction of fear were tested. Conditioned responding was
measured by fear-potentiated startle (FPS), skin conductance (SCR) and UCS expectancy ratings. Our main results
demonstrate that worrying resulted in increased fear responses (FPS) to both the feared stimulus (CS
+) and the originally
safe stimulus (CS
2), whereas FPS remained unchanged in the Control condition. In addition, worrying impaired both
extinction and re-extinction learning of UCS expectancy. The implication of our findings is that they show how worry may
contribute to the development of anxiety disorders by affecting associative fear learning.
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Introduction
Emotional memory is considered to lie at the root of anxiety
disorders, and originates from a learned association between a
previously neutral event (Conditioned Stimulus or CS, e.g., stranger)
and an anticipated catastrophe (Unconditioned Stimulus or UCS, e.g.,
physical attack). Patients with anxiety disorders feel, think and act
as if the feared CS predicts the later occurrence of a catastrophic
outcome (UCS). Although Pavlovian fear conditioning serves as a
valuable experimental model for studying associative fear memory,
it falls short in explaining that most anxiety disorders evolve after
relatively mild aversive events rather than traumatic experiences.
Insights from neuroscience may shed light on this issue, showing
that our memory is continuously updated through an active
organization of new information within the context of previous
experiences. Hence, processes following fear acquisition may also
contribute to the development of pathological fear.
Negative thinking such as worry is a potential candidate for
strengthening associative fear memory after fear acquisition.
Worry is frequently observed in anxiety disorders [1,2], and it
also predicts anxiety symptoms over time [3]. Worry has been
defined as ‘‘a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden
and relatively uncontrollable’’ ([4], p. 10). To account for the
negative consequences of worry, specific components have been
identified: the repetitive nature, the typical negative valence (e.g.,
catastrophizing on a real or potential problem), and the abstract
level of thinking (e.g., thinking about meanings and implications)
[1,5,6].
Several mechanisms may explain how worrisome thoughts may
strengthen associative fear. First, repeatedly thinking about the
fear conditioning experience might both prolong the initial fear
reactions as well as strengthen the association between the mental
representation of the CS and the UCS, which can lead to
increased fear. This can be further explained by recent advances
in neuroscience showing that ‘offline’ processes - the processing
that continues after (new) learning - may modify the original
memory. During the initial memory formation phase (and upon
retrieval), memory traces seem to be open to change [7,8,9]. The
formation of the memory of an event can also be influenced by
the emotional reaction following the event [8]. These post-
learning processes can strengthen or alter the initial association,
potentially resulting in fear enhancement. Second, negative
(catastrophic) beliefs (on the perceived threat or about oneself)
may increase the threat intensity of the acquired fear memory.
This increased threat intensity of the fear associations may not
only strengthen subsequent fear responding, but may also
strengthen the fear association itself. Previous studies in humans
[10] and in rodents [11] have even shown that increased threat
intensity enhances fear generalization, a key characteristic of
anxiety disorders. Third, worry activates an abstract mode of
processing yielding a loss of episodic information [1] and a less
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specificity of the fear acquisition memory may also promote the
generalization of fear.
In the present discriminative fear conditioning study, in which
one of two neutral pictures (CS1
+ but not CS2
2)i sp a i r e dw i t h
an aversive stimulus (i.e. electric stimulus, UCS), we investigated
the effects of experimentally induced worry on associative fear
memory. For the worry induction we presented the participants
with questions regarding their tolerance for and consequences
of the anticipated aversive event (electric stimulus, UCS). These
questions were based on the three main characteristics of
worry (i.e., repetition, negative tone, and abstract style of
thinking) [6,12]. Our study is related to previous work on UCS-
inflation that also provides an explanation for the development
of anxiety disorders after relatively mild aversive events [13].
UCS inflation refers to the observation that increasing the
aversiveness of the UCS following acquisition could enhance the
conditioned response to the CS, without additional associative
learning [13]. However, the process of UCS-inflation solely
involves the aversiveness of the UCS. Note also that the evidence
for UCS-inflation is not very robust and exclusively tested for
electrodermal responding ([14,15] and see for critical discussion
[16]).
Here we tested whether a worry induction that immediately
follows a fear conditioning procedure would enhance the
retention of previously acquired conditioned fear. Conditioned
fear responding (CR) was measured as potentiation of the
eyeblink startle reflex to a loud noise by electromyography (EMG)
of the right orbicularis oculi muscle. Stronger startle responses
to the loud noise during the fear-conditioned stimulus (CS1
+)
as compared to the control stimulus (CS2
2) reflect the fearful
state of the participant elicited by the feared CS. The fear
potentiated startle (FPS) is considered a reliable and specific index
of fear [17], directly connected with and modulated by the
amygdala [18]. The cognitive level of conditioning (anticipation
of an aversive event) and contingency awareness of the fear
association were captured by online UCS expectancy ratings
during each CS presentation. We obtained skin conductance
responses (SCR) as a more objective measure of UCS anticipa-
tion [19,20] - given that SCR is less sensitive to possible demand
effects of our worry manipulation than subjective UCS
expectancy ratings. After differential fear conditioning, partici-
pants were assigned to either the Worry induction or the Control
condition. We tested the effect of worry on the formation of
associative fear memory after the worry manipulation. Further-
more, we included an extinction and reinstatement procedure
(see Figure 1) to investigate whether worrying would impair the
‘unlearning’ of the fear-conditioned behavior and enhance the
recovery of fear. Specifically, we tested whether the worry
manipulation would: 1) enhance fear expression at immediate
testing (i.e., stronger differential (CS
+/CS
2) responding), 2)
promote fear generalization to the safe stimulus (i.e., enhanced
responding to the CS
2), 3) impair extinction learning (i.e.,
diminished reduction in differential responding, 4) generate
stronger return of fear (i.e., stronger differential responding at
reinstatement testing), and 5) impair re-extinction learning -
relative to the control manipulation. Predictions were equal
for the three conditioned response measures, FPS, SCR and
UCS expectancy, except that we did not predict an effect of
worry on UCS expectancy at immediate testing as this measure






No differences in age, sex, trait or state anxiety were found
between the Worry and Control condition (all ts,1.2) (see
Table 1).
Manipulation check (see Appendix S2). Results on
participants’ compliance with the instructions are presented in
Appendix S2. We compared the included and excluded
participants on several participant characteristics. Within the
Worry condition, included participants (n=23) did not differ on
trait anxiety, t,1.2, but did show higher state anxiety compared
with excluded participants (n=8), t(29)=2.26, p=.032, indicating
that low state anxious individuals apparently had more difficulty to
engage in worrying. Within the Control condition, no differences
on participant characteristics were observed, all ts,1.
UCS characteristics (see Table 1). Self-calibrated UCS
(electric stimulus) intensities ranged from 4 to 55 mA with a mean
of 12.15 mA (SD=9.08). After the experiment, the electric
stimulus was rated as moderately to strongly aversive on all
dimensions. No differences between conditions were observed for
selected UCS intensity or in subjective experience of UCS
characteristics (all ts,1.6).
Fear-potentiated startle (Figure 2)
Acquisition. The ANOVA did not reveal the CS-
Type6Trial interaction from the start to the end of acquisition,
F,1. Analyses over all acquisition trials demonstrated a significant
main effect of CS-Type, F(1,40)=15.98, p,.0001, gp
2=.29,
indicating higher mean FPS to the feared (CS1
+) than to the safe
(CS2
2) stimulus. Further, whereas no differential (CS1
+ vs. CS2
2)
FPS was observed at the start of acquisition, F,1.2, we observed a
significantly stronger FPS to CS1
+ than to CS2
2 at the end of
acquisition, F(1,40)=5.00, p=.031, gp
2=.11. This indicates that
the difference between CS1
+ and CS2
2 is the result of acquisition,
and is not due to an initial difference in responding at the start of
acquisition. Most importantly, the rate of fear conditioning did not
differ between conditions, Fs,1.
Post-Manipulation Test. The ANOVA revealed no CS-
type6Trial6Condition interaction, F,1.3, but a significant
Trial6Condition interaction effect emerged from the end of
acquisition to the first test trial following the manipulation,
F(1,40)=4.14, p=.048, gp
2=.09. Post-hoc analyses revealed an
increase in FPS responding to both the feared (CS1) and safe
stimulus (CS2) in the Worry condition, as illustrated by a
significant main effect of Trial, F(1,19)=13.01, p=.002,
gp
2=.41, while FPS to both CSs remained unchanged in the
Control condition, F,0.1 (see Figure 2). In addition, while
differential (CS1.CS2) startle responding was no longer observed
in the Worry condition at test, F(1,19),1, differential startle
acquisition was retained in the Control condition, as shown by a
trend effect of CS-Type, F(1,21)=3.21, p=.083, gp
2=.14. To test
whether the foregoing effect could be attributed to the worry
manipulation and did not result from a pre-existing acquisition
difference or a general (baseline) increase in startle responses,
additional analyses were performed. First, analyses confirmed that
conditions did neither differ in differential FPS on the last
acquisition trial, F,1, nor in mean FPS (to both CSs) during
acquisition, F,2.1. Second, the effect can also not be explained by
a general increase in startle responses, as indicated by the absence
of a Condition6Trial interaction on NA trials during the intertrial
intervals (ITI) from acquisition to test, F,1. In sum, the Worry
manipulation resulted in increased FPS to both the feared (CS+)
Worry and Associative Fear Learning
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Control condition.
Extinction. The ANOVA did not yield a CS-type6Trial
interaction from the start to the end of extinction, F,1, but a
significant linear main effect of Trial was observed,
F(1,40)=99.12, p,.0001, gp
2=.71, indicating a decline in FPS
to both CSs. Since startle responding was also elevated to the
CS2
2 at the start of extinction, a general decrease in startle
responding was shown. Further, analyses showed no CS-
Type6Trial6Condition interaction, F,1, but did reveal a CS-
Type6Condition interaction, F(1,40)=4.46, p=.041, gp
2=.10.
First, this indicates that the conditions did not differ in differential
extinction learning, but they differed in overall differential startle
response. Follow-up analyses showed that this effect was due to
elevated startle to the CS2 in the Worry condition, F(1,40)=9.01,
p=.005, gp
2=.18, and not CS1, F,.2.
Reinstatement. The unpredictable UCS (i.e., reinstatement
testing) generated an increase in FPS to both CS1 and CS2 from
the end of extinction to the start of re-extinction, F(1,39)=21.74,
p,.0001, gp
2=.36. No interactions with Condition were observed,
Fs,1.7. These results indicate that the effect of Worry induction
did not extend to reinstatement testing.
Relearning of extinction. The subsequent analysis on re-
extinction neither revealed condition differences, Fs,1.8. Analyses
showed only a significant main effect of Trial, F(1,39);=32.94,
p,.0001, gp
2=.46, indicating a general decrease in FPS.
UCS expectancy (Figure 3)
Acquisition. Successful contingency learning was shown by a
significant CS-type6Trial interaction, F(1,46)=365.29, p,.0001,
gp
2=.89, indicating CS1
+ had become a meaningful predictor for
the UCS and CS2
2 for the non-occurrence of the UCS.
Acquisition patterns did not differ between conditions, F,1.4.
Post-Manipulation Test. Following the inductions,
participants showed a clear decrement in differential UCS
expectancy (CS1 vs. CS2) as was indicated by a significant CS-
type6Trial interaction, F(1,46)=36.13, p,.0001, gp
2=.44. We
observed no difference between conditions, F,2.1.
Extinction. The ANOVA revealed the expected CS-
type6Trial6Condition interaction from the start to the end of
extinction, F(1,46)=4.68, p=.036, gp
2=.09, indicating reduced
extinction learning for the Worry condition compared to the
Control condition (Figure 3). First, the extinction procedure
yielded a significant decrease in differential UCS expectancy
in<lpar;1,45)=3.95, p=.053, gp
2=.08). Together, our results
suggest that the worry manipulation enhanced return of shock
expectancy.
Re-extinction. In both conditions, re-extinction of UCS
expectancy was indicated by a significant effect of Trial,
F(1,45)=71.31, p,.0001, gp
2=.61, without a CS-Type6Trial
interaction. This general decrease may be due to the finding that
UCS expectancy to CS2 was also elevated at the first
reinstatement test trials. The conditions differed in their mean
differential (CS1 vs. CS2) UCS expectancy, as shown by a near
Figure 1. Experimental Design. CS1: stimulus paired with the unconditioned stimulus (UCS; electric stimulus) during acquisition (75%
reinforcement rate); CS2: unreinforced stimulus; NA: Noise Alone trials during inter-trial intervals. Flash: electric stimulus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034882.g001
Table 1. Participant characteristics and UCS characteristics.
Worry (n=23) Control (n=25) T-test
M (SD) M (SD) t (46) p
Demographics
Age 22.28 (4.90) 22.12 (2.71) .14 .886
Sex 19 females 18 females 1.17 .248
Anxiety
State Anxiety 39.17 (9.37) 36.84 (9.23) .87 .389
Trait Anxiety 40.00 (8.15) 37.20 (9.08) 1.12 .268
UCS Characteristics
Selected UCS intensity 10.13 (5.09) 14.00 (1.41) 1.54 .134
Experienced intensity of UCS (0=light to 10=unbearable) 4.38 (1.69) 4.60 (1.53) .47 .642
UCS unpleasantness, annoyance (0=not unpleasant to 10=very unpleasant) 6.14 (1.36) 6.44 (1.85) .64 .527
Frightened by the UCS (0=not at all to 10=very strong) 6.23 (1.76) 6.64 (1.49) .87 .388
Means and SDs of the Demographics, State and Trait Anxiety [41] and UCS Characteristics of the Worry and Control condition separately. All values represent raw,
nonstandardized scores.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034882.t001
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p=.053, gp
2=.08, without a CS-Type6Trial6Condition
interaction, F,1 (Figure 3). Subsequent comparisons again
showed that the Worry condition rated significantly stronger
differential UCS expectancy than the Control condition at the end
of re-extinction (trend CS-Type6Condition interaction;
F(1,45)=3.64, p=.069, gp
2=.07). To further explore the
patterns of re-extinction learning, pairwise comparisons (FDR
corrected) showed that the Worry condition continuously rated
significantly higher UCS expectancy for the feared (CS1+) than for
the safe stimulus (CS22) at every re-extinction trial, all ps,.0005,
while the Control condition did not show differential UCS
expectancy at any trial, all ps..05. Together, our results indicate
that the worry induction resulted in impaired extinction of shock
expectancies, enhanced return of shock expectancy and reduced
re-extinction learning.
Discussion
The present study provides experimental support for the
prediction that worrying about feared outcomes can affect
associative fear learning. Our results demonstrate that worrying
after fear acquisition can enhance subsequent conditioned fear to
both the conditioned and safe stimulus and can impair extinction
at the cognitive level of conditioned responding. Specifically,
several minutes of rehearsing catastrophic statements on the
personal consequences of a noxious event (i.e., the electric
stimulus) resulted in enhanced fear-potentiated startle (FPS) to
the originally feared stimulus (CS
+) and a generalization of fear to
the safe stimulus (CS
2). In contrast, fear responses remained
unchanged in the control condition. Note that the elevated
conditioned fear response cannot merely be attributed to a general
arousing effect, as worry did not enhance startle responding to the
context (during the inter-trial intervals). Our worry induction
elevated the immediate startle fear responses but the effect was not
extended to later phases of testing (i.e., extinction, reinstatement
and re-extinction). Further, as expected, the worry manipulation
impaired extinction learning of UCS expectancy, generated a
stronger return of differential UCS expectancy (reinstatement
testing) that persisted to impair re-extinction learning.
Our finding that post-acquisition worrying affects the formation
of fear memory can be explained by the literature on memory
consolidation, which shows that a memory trace can be changed
after its original acquisition by either neurobiological or behavioral
manipulations [7,8,21]. Note that we did not observe evidence for
the alternative account of UCS inflation [13] as our retrospective
evaluation of the UCS did not differ between conditions.
Interestingly, the current finding that worrying enhanced
subsequent physiological fear responding seems at first difficult
to reconcile with the original claim that worry is associated with a
suppression of emotional responding [22]. However, a recent
review and re-reanalysis of the existing experimental data on the
effects of worry [23] revealed that the majority of experimental
studies actually show that worry facilitates and maintains a
sustained negative emotional state during the worry process itself
[24]. In fact, re-analyzing previous studies in which a dampening
Figure 2. Worry manipulation after acquisition increases fear at test. A. Mean fear-potentiated startle (FPS; standardized T-scores) to the
feared stimulus (CS1), safe stimulus (CS2) and during inter-trial intervals (ITI) during acquisition, extinction, reinstatement test and re-extinction for the
Control condition (Con) and Worry condition separately. B. Mean change in startle responding to the feared stimulus (CS1), safe stimulus (CS2) and
during inter-trial intervals (ITI) from the end of acquisition to test (start of extinction) for the Worry and Control condition (Con). Induction: worry or
control manipulation; UCS with Flash: electric stimulus administered during reinstatement; Error bars reflect SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034882.g002
Figure 3. Worry manipulation after acquisition impairs extinction and re-extinction at the cognitive level of conditioned
responding. Mean UCS expectancy ratings for the feared stimulus (CS1) and safe stimulus (CS2) during acquisition, extinction, reinstatement test
and re-extinction for the Worry and Control condition (Con). Induction: worry or control manipulation; UCS with Flash: electric stimulus administered
during reinstatement; Error bars reflect SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034882.g003
Worry and Associative Fear Learning
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e34882effect of worry on subsequent physiological reactivity were found
revealed that these effects are confounded by baseline differences
[23]. More specifically, if one already experiences negative arousal
during worry, and worry is used as the comparison baseline, it
appears that prior worry only prevents a further increase in
emotional responding [25,26]. When a pre-worry resting baseline
is used as the comparison point, there is no evidence for a muting
effect of worry on reactivity to fear stimuli ([26–30] and see for
review and discussion [23]). Even though our data do not allow
drawing conclusions on the effects of worry during the process
itself - as we did not measure reactivity during the worry
manipulation - they are consistent with the propositions that worry
1) facilitates negative emotional reactivity [23] and 2) prolongs the
cognitive representation of the stressor and its concomitant
negative emotional state [24].
Although the effect of worrying was immediately expressed at
the more implicit, psychophysiological level of fear (fear-potenti-
ated startle), we observed a delayed effect at the more explicit,
cognitive level of conditioning (UCS expectancies) (i.e., impaired
(re2)extinction learning). One explanation for the absence of
sustained effects on startle responding may be that the extinction
training - which is a robust manipulation in itself - overruled the
effect of the current worry induction. Our manipulation of ‘state
worry’ by a verbal, cognitive task may have been too subtle to
compete with the extinction manipulation to affect physiological
responding. On the other hand, the present worry manipulation
did impair extinction learning at the cognitive level of conditioning
(UCS expectancy) and this effect persisted throughout re-
extinction learning. It should be noted that this elevated
differential UCS expectancy during reinstatement and re-extinc-
tion can be a consequence of incomplete extinction. The present
findings of impaired extinction are in line with the recent
proposition that worry reduces the capacity for emotional
learning. Worry may affect the processing of emotional informa-
tion in such a way that it interferes with learning from experience
[23]. This deficient emotional information processing may
contribute to the maintenance of anxious meanings attributed to
stimuli (e.g., feared CS) [23].
Our present findings extend previous studies by demonstrating
for the first time an effect of experimentally induced worry on
conditioned fear responding. Furthermore, our worry manipulation
about the personal negative consequences of the noxious event
(i.e., electric stimulus) also produced a fear response to the safe
stimulus. This effect may be interpreted as generalized fear
responding and is in line with other studies showing that
generalization is dependent on fear intensity (in humans: [10], in
rodents: [11]). Stronger generalization of conditioned fear to safe
stimuli has also been observed – without any manipulation - in
both individuals at risk for anxiety and patients with anxiety
disorders (e.g., Gazendam, Kamphuis & Kindt, Unpublished
Data, [30]). Fear generalization may be interpreted from a
functional perspective. Upon a fearful experience, we are
automatically in search for predictors of the event in order to
prepare for future encounters [31]. If the expected outcome is
perceived as more catastrophic, one may rely on a more
generalized class of predictors in order to minimize the risk of
‘missing’ the catastrophe.
The current study was limited in that the effects of worrying
were only observed for the startle reflex and UCS-expectancies,
but not for electrodermal activity (SCR). Also, the main effect of
worry on the fear-potentiated startle was short-lived, that is, it did
not extend to phases beyond the first test phase. It should be noted
that we only tested the effect of worry on conditioned responding
directly following the manipulation. Future studies could explore
whether worry also affects the consolidation of fear memory (e.g.,
24 hours later). An alternative explanation for the observed
enhancement of fear responding is that worry may have induced
anticipatory anxiety. However, induction of an anxious state
would probably have resulted into a general increase of startle
responding to the context. Given that the manipulation did not
yield a difference between the worry and control condition in
startle responding to the context (noise alone trials), we do not
consider this explanation as very tenable (see Results page 8).
Further, as our manipulation incorporated the three characteris-
tics of worrying (i.e., the repetitive nature, negative content, and
abstract style of thinking) [6,12], the exact mechanism of the fear
enhancement remains unclear. As such, this study can only be
regarded as a first step, and future studies could disentangle the
effects of the different components of worrying to explore which
components may be responsible for the fear enhancing effects.
Germane to this issue is the lack of indexing the different
components of worrying in our manipulation check. However, to
our knowledge, no golden standard exists for assessing the separate
components of worry. The evaluation of one’s own thinking style
by self-report (e.g., indicating the degree to which thinking is
abstract, verbal or visual) is notoriously unreliable [32]. Moreover,
a potential negative side effect of verbalizing thoughts is that it also
may influence the process under investigation. Another potential
limitation of our experimental design may be our control
condition. In the present control condition we utilized a
manipulation (i.e., difficult, neutral questions) to exert optimal
control over the content of thinking. However, one may argue that
control questions could alternatively lead to distraction. The
difficulty of designing an appropriate control condition has also
been recognized by other researchers in the field: the alternative of
a passive control condition (i.e., doing nothing) may allow
naturally occurring worry processes to take place [33], whereas
any active control condition may act as a distraction [5].
Nevertheless, as fear responses remained stable after our control
manipulation, the observed differences between the conditions can
probably be attributed to the worry manipulation.
Another related point of concern regarding our manipulation is
that a number of participants failed to comply with the
manipulations. Depending on the idiosyncratic tendency to worry
in daily life, for some individuals it may be difficult to engage in
worry upon instruction (i.e., some participants from our worry
condition reported having spent more time thinking about other,
unrelated things than about the worry questions), whereas other
individuals will habitually start to reflect on the aversive
experience regardless of the instructions (i.e., some of our control
participants spent more time spontaneously recalling the electrical
stimulus than answering the control questions). This raises the
issue of how worry and control manipulations could be improved.
An alternative approach is to capitalize on individual differences in
the tendency to worry (e.g., trait worriers). Our finding that
participants who failed to engage in worrying were characterized
by lower state anxiety scores (excluded participants, see page 7)
supports the notion of individual differences in the susceptibility
for induction of negative thinking styles. We further suggest that
the efficacy of the control induction may be improved by using a
(neutral) computer game or a reaction time task that fully occupies
the mental activity, minimizing the possibility for unintentional
worrying.
In sum, the present results suggest that worry after initial fear
acquisition may affect the formation of fear memory and impair
fear extinction. This study opens up new avenues to experimen-
tally investigate the effect of cognitive dysfunctional processing
Worry and Associative Fear Learning
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Materials and Methods
Participants
Sixty-nine healthy undergraduate students (73.9% female, age
M=22.2 years) participated in the study in return for course
credits or a small monetary reward (seven Euros). This study has
been approved by the ethical committee of the University of
Amsterdam, and written informed consent has been obtained from
all participants. All participants were screened to be free from any
medical condition that would contraindicate participation: preg-
nancy, seizure disorder, cardiovascular disease, visual or hearing
problems. Participants were randomly assigned to the Worry
condition or Control condition with the restriction that groups
were matched on sex.
Manipulation
The experimental condition involved induction of worry after
fear acquisition by presenting catastrophic questions regarding the
participants’ tolerance for the stressor (UCS) (adapted from
[6,34]). Subjects in the Control condition received neutral
questions on societal matters. Six questions were sequentially
presented on the screen for 15 s for both the Worry and Control
condition. Each question was followed by a cue ‘Think about this
question. Try to answer and remember the question as well as possible.’ for
10 s, and after another 20 s the next question was presented.
Worry condition. Questions consisted of the electric stimulus
and subjects’ reactions to it. Before the first question, participants
received the instruction to repeat each question sub-vocally. The
following questions (translated from Dutch, see Appendix S1) were
presented in random order:
1. What if there will be more electrical stimuli, will I be able to tolerate them?
2. Why exactly have I chosen to participate in a study with electrical stimuli?
3. What if I cannot take the electrical stimuli anymore and have to quit the
experiment?
4. What happens if they discover that my reaction to the electrical stimuli is
abnormal in a certain way?
5. What if the electrical stimuli in the next phases will be much more painful?
6. What happens if the electrical stimuli are somehow bad for me?
Control condition. The six control questions (Appendix S1;
adapted from [6]) were demanding, aimed to fully engage the
working memory and to maximize control over participants
thinking activities during the induction. Participants were asked to
solve the questions and remember the answers, thereby enhancing
motivation for putting effort in finding answers. An example item
was: How many countries are member of the European Union? Which
countries?
Apparatus and materials
Setup. The experiment was run on a Pentium IV 3 GHz PC.
The software program ‘Presentation’ (Version 12.2) managed the
display of the CSs and the expectancy rating scale and employed a
trigger signal to initiate UCS delivery. It also recorded the
expectancy ratings. The software program Vsrrp98 v7.6c
(Versatile Stimulus Response Registration Program, 1998;
Technical Support Group of the Department of Psychology,
University of Amsterdam) managed registration of startle
amplitudes and skin conductance. In addition, this program
produced 60–70 dB constant background noise.
Stimuli. The conditioned stimuli (CS1
+ and CS2
2) presented
during acquisition and extinction comprised two geometrical
figures (a brown circle and a grey square) that were similar in
brightness. The stimuli were presented in the middle of a black
screen on a 19-inch computer monitor. During acquisition, one of
the figures (CS1
+) was most of the time followed by an UCS, while
the other figure (CS2
2) was never followed by an UCS.
Assignment of the slides as CS1 and CS2 was counterbalanced
across participants. The unconditioned stimulus (UCS) constituted
of a 2-ms electric stimulus produced by a Digitimer DS7A
constant current stimulator (Hertfordshire, UK). The UCS was
administered to the left wrist via a pair of standard Ag/AgCl
electrodes filled with electrolyte gel (Signa, Parker) [35]. UCS
intensity was individually set by each participant to the level
‘‘difficult to tolerate, but not painful’’.
Data Collection
Fear-potentiated startle (FPS). The eyeblink component of
the startle response was measured by activity recording of the
orbicularis oculi electromyogram (EMG). The acoustic startle
probe consists of a 40-ms duration, 104 dB burst of white noise
with a near instantaneous rise time, presented binaurally by
headphones. Two 7-mm Ag/AgCl electrodes filled with electrolyte
gel were positioned approximately 1 cm under the pupil and 1 cm
below the lateral canthus. In order to maintain electrically
identical paths and reduce common noise, the ground reference
was placed 63 cm below the orbicularis oculi pars orbitalis on an
electrically neutral site [19]. The eyeblink EMG activity was
measured using a bundled pair of electrode wires connected to a
front-end amplifier with an input resistance of 10 MV and a
bandwidth of DC-1500 Hz. To remove unwanted interference, a
notch filter was set at 50 Hz. Integration was handled by a true-
RMS converter (contour follower) with a time constant of 25 ms.
The integrated EMG signal was sampled at 100 Hz. Startle
responses were identified allowing onset between 10–120 ms after
probe onset and peak amplitudes were identified from 20 ms after
startle onset to 200 ms following this probe.
Skin conductance response. Skin conductance was
recorded through electrodes attached to the medial phalanges of
the second and fourth fingers of the non-preferred hand. SCR
elicited by the CS were registered each 0.5 s. The skin
conductance responses were calculated by subtracting a baseline
of the mean 2 s before CS presentation from the maximum of the
following 7 s during CS presentation [19,36–40]. Although many
previous studies examined the first interval response (FIR) or
second interval response (SIR), more recent work suggests that the
utility in distinguishing between FIR and SIR is limited and the
‘Entire interval response’ (EIR) scoring method is recommended
[36]. The EIR method eliminates the risk that ‘‘responses may be
underestimated when the response occurs near a previously
established boundary between the FIR and SIR or when the
latency of the peak response shifts over trials’’ ([36], p.993).
UCS Expectancy ratings. Expectancy of the UCS was rated
online during CS presentations on a continuous scale anchored
‘Certainly no electric stimulus’ (25) to ‘Uncertain’ (0) to ‘Certainly
an electric stimulus’ (5). Ratings were registered on a 200 point
scale (2100 to 100).
Subjective assessments
STAI-T and STAI-S. Trait anxiety and state anxiety were
assessed by Spielberger’s State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Dutch
version: [41]). The STAI-T and STAI-S are 20 items self-report
questionnaires that measure participants’ predispositions to
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psychometric properties [41].
UCS Characteristics. At the end of the experiment
participants were asked to complete the post experimental UCS
Characteristics questionnaire measured on VAS scales (0–100)o n
the (a) (un)pleasantness of the electric stimulus, anchored from
‘Not unpleasant’, to ‘Unpleasant’ to ‘Very unpleasant’ (b) the
intensity of UCS, anchored from ‘Light’, to ‘Intense’ to
‘Intolerable’, (c) the degree to which the electric stimulus
frightened them, anchored from ‘Not at all’ to ‘Moderately’ to
‘Very strongly’ [42].
Manipulation check. The manipulation check questionnaire
(adapted from [6,34]) consisted of eight items, which aimed to
retrospectively assess serious participation during the 6 min
thinking induction. The following questions were presented: 1)
How well one had been able to think about the questions (‘0’=Not
at all to ‘4’=Very). 2) What percentage of time had been spent
thinking about the questions (0–100%). 3) What percentage of
time had been spent thinking about things unrelated to the
questions (0–100%). 4) What percentage of time had been spent
recalling the electric stimulus (0–100%). 5) During the induction,
what percentage of time the participant had been having bodily
sensations versus thoughts (0–100%). 6) How distressing it was to
think about the questions (‘0’=Not at all to ‘4’=Very). 7) How
strongly one had felt obliged to think about the questions (‘0’=Not
at all to ‘4’=Very). 8) How well one had found answers on the
questions (‘0’=Not at all to ‘4’=Very Well).
Experimental procedure and design (Figure 1)
After attachment of all electrodes, participants were asked to fill
out the State Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S). Next, UCS intensity
was individually calibrated. Then, participants were instructed
about the conditioning procedure, that is, one of two figures will
sometimes be followed by an electric stimulus whilst the other will
never be followed by an electric stimulus.
In the Habituation phase, eight acoustic startle probes were
delivered to reduce initial startle reactivity, allowing discriminative
emotional effects on startle reactivity during the experimental
procedure [43]. In the Acquisition phase, partial reinforcement of
the feared stimulus (CS1
+) was implemented to delay the onset of
extinction [44]. CS1
+ and CS2
2 were both presented 8 times
(CS1
+ was 6 times followed by the UCS) semi-randomly with the
restriction of no more than two consecutive presentations of either
CS1
+ or CS2
2. Both stimuli were presented for 8 s, the startle
probe was delivered 7 s after stimulus onset (late probe), and for
CS1
+ trials the UCS was delivered at 7.5 s. The inter-trial intervals
(ITI) varied between 16–29 s with a mean of 22 s, during which
startle probes (Noise Alone trials, NA) were delivered. Throughout
the first 5 s of every stimulus presentation, participants were
required to rate their expectancy of an electric stimulus by shifting
a pointer on a bar.
Prior to the Manipulation, participants received online instruc-
tions that no electrical stimuli or loud noises would be
administered during this phase. Then participants were asked to
concentrate and think thoroughly about the coming questions.
Also, it was noted that the experiment would continue afterwards.
For both conditions, the experiment continued with Extinction.
After 1 NA trial, the unreinforced CS1
2 (no UCS) and CS2
2 were
presented 12 times randomly with another 8 NA trials.
Reinstatement was implemented by delivery of one unsignaled
UCS. Following another ITI (17 s) and after 1 NA trial, Relearning
of extinction consisted of 6 presentations of unreinforced CS1
2 and
CS2
2 semi-randomly with another 5 NA trials. Together, a startle
probe was delivered during each CS and each ITI, resulting in a
total of 83 probes (habituation: 8, acquisition: 24, extinction: 33;
re-extinction: 18).
Afterwards, electrodes were removed and participants complet-
ed the post-experimental questions regarding the characteristics of
the UCS [42], the Manipulation Check questionnaire, exit-
questions, and the STAI-T. Finally, participants from the Worry
condition were debriefed, reaffirming the actual safety of the
electric stimulus.
Data reduction and data analysis
For SCR analyses, no significant acquisition effect and no effects
of the manipulation were obtained. Therefore, the SCR data are
not presented.
Participant Exclusion. To ensure the validity of our
inductions (see Manipulation and Appendix S1), we
implemented a manipulation check (MC; see Manipulation
check above and Appendix S2). In total, twenty-one participants
(Control; n=11; Worry; n=10) had to be excluded from further
analyses because of failure to comply with the instructions.
Compliance with the instructions was necessary for the effect to
occur, as analyses on the total sample did not reveal significant
condition differences, F,1.7. Two participants were excluded
because they reported not having taken instructions seriously. The
other participants were excluded because they indicated 1) that
they did not feel inclined to think about the questions (score 0;
n=7), 2) to have spent more or equal time thinking about things
unrelated to the induction questions than about the questions and
the electric stimulus in the Worry condition (n=6), or 3) to have
spent more or equal time thinking about the electric stimulus than
about the induction questions in the Control condition (n=8). The
final sample consisted of 48 participants: Worry (n=23) and
Control condition (n=25).
Data reduction. For FPS analyses, six additional participants
were excluded because of technical problems (e.g., noise in the
EMG signal, EMG responses exceeding the measurement scale)
(n=6) and one participant only lacked FPS data of the re-
extinction phase due to a problem with the electrode attachment
(n=1). Taken together, startle analyses are based on the data of 42
participants (Worry n=20, 3 male; Control n=22, 7 male), with
reinstatement analyses and re-extinction on 41 participants. UCS
expectancy analyses are based on the complete data of 48
participants (Worry n=23, 4 male; Control n=25, 8 male), with
reinstatement and re-extinction analyses on 47 participants. The
FPS and UCS expectancy samples did not differ in terms of age,
reported trait and state anxiety, UCS intensity and UCS
evaluation (ts(40),1.5). Further note that analyses of UCS
expectancy over the FPS subset (n=42) revealed a similar
pattern of results as analyses over the entire sample. In specific,
analyses did also not reveal any differences between conditions at
immediate testing (post manipulation; Fs(1,40),1.3), and similar
results were observed at reinstatement testing and re-extinction
(CS-Type6Condition; ps,.057), except that the difference
between conditions during extinction no longer reached
significance (CS-Type6Trial6Condition; F(1,40),2.5).
Missing values. Startle measurements that showed recording
artifacts or excessive baseline activity were discarded by the
Vs.rrp98 v7.6c software program, resulting in 2 out of the 3132
discarded startle measurements. Outliers (.3 SD from the mean)
within participants were removed (yielding the top 26 trials). In
addition, outliers between participants were removed, calculated
from the mean over participants separately per condition (yielding
2 excluded trials) [45]. The resulting total missing data (i.e., 30 of
3132 trials) were replaced with the mean of the valid response
before and/or after that data point within each participant (0–4
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response magnitudes, blink data were subject-wise z transformed
(based on all startle responses during acquisition, extinction and
re-extinction) [46]. These z-scores were next converted to T-scores
(T=(z * 10)+50) in order to obtain unidirectional values [47].
Because startle magnitudes vary strongly, the factor Trial was
based on the average of two successive trials and UCS expectancy
ratings were averaged similarly.
Data analysis. To check for between condition differences,
the STAI-T, Manipulation Check and UCS characteristic
questionnaires were analyzed using independent t-tests. FPS and
UCS expectancy data were analyzed with repeated measures
ANOVAs with condition (Worry vs. Control) as between-subjects
factor and CS-Type (CS1 vs. CS2) and Trial as within-subjects
factors. To test the major hypotheses, planned contrasts were
performed. Follow-up analyses were performed following
significant ANOVAs by pairwise comparisons or separate
within-condition ANOVAs.
Acquisition was analyzed by comparing the differential response
(CS1 vs. CS2) at the start (trial 1, 2) of acquisition to the end (trial
7, 8) of acquisition. To analyze the immediate effect of the
Manipulation, the differential response (CS1 vs. CS2) at the end of
acquisition was compared with the start (trial 1, 2) of extinction.
To test for magnitude of Extinction, differential responding (CS1 vs.
CS2) at the start of extinction was compared with the end (trial 11,
12) of extinction. The Reinstatement effect was assessed by
comparing the differential responding (CS1 vs. CS2) at the end
of extinction with the first test trials (trial 1, 2; start of re-
extinction). Relearning of extinction was tested identical to extinction.
We performed separate additional analyses for the startle
responses during the ITIs in order to control for non-specific
differences in arousal between the two conditions, with Condition
as between-subject factor and Trial (NA trials) as within-subject
factor. A Greenhouse-Geisser (GGe) procedure was applied in case
of violation of the sphericity assumption. An alpha level of .05 was
used for all statistical analyses. False Discovery Rate (FDR)
correction [48] was applied to all post-hoc comparisons when
indicated. Partial eta squared (gp2; [49]) was used as index of
effect size. For experimental studies an effect size of gp
2=.01 is
considered small, gp
2=.09 medium, and gp
2=.25 large [45,49].
Supporting Information
Appendix S1 Manipulation. Dutch version of Worry ques-
tions and Control questions in both Dutch and English.
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